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the names of the jurors were taken ".

.

. from the voters' registration

list of Lake County in proportion to the number of white and colored
persons whose names were on the voters' registration books."11 In
other words, the United States Supreme Court apparently based its
reversal on the use of racial proportion as the test of fairness in selection. The Cassel case had covered this precise question.
State officials in charge of selecting grand and petit juries must
accordingly recognize the fact that all local restrictions on qualifications for jury duty must square with the requirements of the United
States Constitution. Attempts to base selection on race, or presumably, on creed as well, violate the Fourteenth Amendment, regardless
of any apparent momentary benefit or detriment to the race or creed
singled out for consideration. On more than one occasion the Court
has pointed out that the accused may not demand or expect that
members of his race be represented on the jury. 12 He has merely the
right to demand that a jury be selected fairly, without regard to race.
Louis DE LA PARTE

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: STATE REGULATION OF
SOLICITORS ENGAGED IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE
Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951)
Appellant, a regional representative of Keystone Readers Service,
Inc., was arrested in the City of Alexandria, Louisiana, while engaged
in door-to-door soliciting of subscriptions for nationally known magazines. He was convicted on the ground that he had not obtained prior
consent of the occupants of residences solicited, as required by ordinance. After affirmance by the Louisiana Supreme Court, appeal lay1
to the United States Supreme Court. HELD, the ordinance is a valid
exercise of the municipality's police power and its enforcement is
not an undue burden on interstate commerce. 2 Judgment affirmed,
Chief Justice Vinson and Justice Douglas dissenting.
"At

p. 884.

12Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398 (1945); Thomas v. Texas, 212 U.S. 278 (1909);
Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S. 316 (1906).
128 U.S.C. §1257 (1948)
2Appellant relied on three contentions in pleading the unconstitutionality of

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol5/iss2/8

2

Carpenter: Constitutional Law: State Regulation of Solicitors Engaged In Int
CASE COMMENTS
Apparently the municipalities of the country have finally devised
a constitutional method of regulating direct-to-consumer merchandising of goods that move interstate. 3 The regulation upheld in the
principal case 4 followed a long series of unsuccessful attempts. Early
ordinances aimed at curtailing house-to-house canvassing by peddlers
and solicitors employed by out-of-state business firms were chiefly
in the form of taxes and licenses. 5 In determining the validity of such
tax measures the courts first distinguished between peddling and soliciting,6 upholding such taxes as applied to the former but holding
any tax or license on soliciting to be a burden on interstate com7
merce.
Seeing that it could not validly regulate direct-to-consumer merchandising by means of taxation and license requirements, the town
of Green River, Wyoming, in 1931 passed an ordinance substantially
the same as that involved in the principal case. This ordinance has
since been adopted by municipalities over the nation, chiefly upon

the ordinance: (1) that it violated the commerce clause; (2) that it violated the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by denying solicitors the right
to engage in their chosen occupation; and (3) that it violated the Ist Amendment
guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press, made applicable to the states
by the due process clause of the 14th Amendment.
3Municipalities should note before passing ordinances of the Green River type
that, although the ordinance in the principal case was held not violative of any
federal constitutional provision, eleven of the sixteen states considering the ordinance have held it invalid, all partly on nonfederal grounds. The states holding
the ordinances invalid are Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Nebraska,
New Jersey, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia. See, e.g., Prior v.
White, 132 Fla. 1, 180 So. 347 (1938); DeBerry v. LaGrange, 62 Ga. App. 74, 8
S.E.2d 146 (1940); Orangeburg v. Farmer, 181 S.C. 143, 186 S.E. 783 (1936).
4
Pertinent portions of the ordinance are: "Be it ordained.., that the practice
of going in and upon private residences in the city . . . by solicitors, peddlers,
hawkers, itinerant merchants or transient vendors of merchandise not having been
requested or invited so to do by the owner or owners, occupant or occupants of
said private residences for the purpose of soliciting orders for the sale of goods,
wares, and merchandise and/or disposing of and/or peddling or hawking the same
is declared to be a nuisance and punishable as such nuisance as a misdemeanor."
5Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946); Real Silk Hosiery Mills v. Portland,
268 U.S. 325 (1925); Crenshaw v. Arkansas, 227 U.S. 389 (1913); Robbins v. Shelby
County Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489 (1887).
(For a discussion of the meaning of peddling in Florida see 2 U. oF FLA. L. REv.
440 (1949).
7Crenshaw v. Arkansas, 227 U.S. 389 (1913); Emert v. Missouri, 156 U.S. 296
(1895); Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489 (1887).
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complaints of local merchants of the growth of direct-to-consumer
selling.8
The Court is committed to the doctrine that even though a regulation has more than an incidental effect on interstate commerce it
will be upheld if the local need for such regulation is apparent. 9 The
Green River type of ordinance has been upheld upon the theory that
the ringing of doorbells by peddlers and solicitors has become an
annoyance to citizens of the communities and that it is therefore within the police power of the municipalities to hold peddling and soliciting a criminal nuisance. 10 Some courts and law review writers, however, viewing the problem as an economic one, have taken the position that this theory allows the municipalities to place a direct
burden upon interstate commerce under the false guise of shielding
the people from a nuisance. 1 The recent decisions in Hood & Sons
v. DuMond12 and Dean Milk Co. v. Madison,"1 upon which appellant
placed great weight, reiterated the rule that state regulation for local
economic advantage will be held invalid if a burden is thereby placed
on interstate commerce. It is difficult to reconcile the Court's present
position 14 permitting virtual prohibition of soliciting with its prior
decisions holding a tax on soliciting a burden on interstate commerce.' 5 In the principal case the Court expressly refused to consider
the contention that the real reason for passing the ordinance was to
protect the local merchants, and rested its decision on the necessity of
protecting the privacy of the home.
ssee Orangeburg v. Farmer, 181 S.C. 143, 150, 186 S.E. 783, 785 (1936); see Jensen, Burdening Interstate Direct Selling under Claims of State Police Power, 12
RoCKY MT. L. REV. 257, 269 (1940).
9Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943); see Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S.
525, 533 (1949).
IoGreen River v. Fuller Brush Co., 63 F.2d 112 (10th Cir. 1933).
"1Prior v. White, 132 Fla. 1, 180 So. 347 (1938); Orangeburg v. Farmer, 181
S.C. 143, 186 S.E. 783 (1936); see Jensen, supra note 8, at 280.
12336 U.S. 525 (1949). Compare, e.g., Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S.
511 (1935) (minimum New York milk prices not validly applicable to Vermont
milk sold in New York because burden on interstate commerce), with Nebbia v.
New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (minimum price on intrastate milk transactions
permitted under state police power).
13340 U.S. 349 (1951). For a similar Florida decision as regards intrastate milk
sales see Gustafson v. Ocala, 53 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 1951). 4 U. oF FLA. L. Rzv. 403
(1951).
14See the discussion in 18 MINN. L. REV. 475 (1934).
lsSee note 5 supra.
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